Abstract
Introduction
In times of political turmoil, insurrectional movements fighting for independence have rights and obligations under international law. 1 This issue is independent of the question whether insurrectional movements have been recognized with an international legal personality under international law. 2 There exists a well-established principle of international law according to which a state should not be held responsible for internationally wrongful acts committed by an unsuccessful insurrectional movement against other states in its struggle for independence. 3 The question addressed in this paper arises whenever an insurrectional movement succeeds in establishing a new state, and not merely in becoming a new government of an already existing state. 4 This paper examines in detail the scope and content of the principle that a new state is responsible for internationally wrongful acts committed by an insurrectional movement during its armed struggle for independence. . 6 This principle has surprisingly not been the object of extensive attention by past and contemporary legal scholars.
7 This article will examine the different theoretical foundations that have been submitted in doctrine in order to explain why a new state should be responsible for acts committed by rebels before its independence. The (limited) state practice supporting the principle of devolution of responsibility will also be analysed. Finally, the article will examine the concrete application of this principle for different types of succession of states.
The Theoretical Foundation of the Principle Adopted by the ILC Articles on State Responsibility
According to Article 10(2) of the Articles on State Responsibility adopted by the ILC, the conduct of 'a movement, insurrectional or other' which establishes a new state 'in part of the territory of a pre-existing state or in a territory under its administration shall be considered an act of the new state under international law'. 8 The 1961 Harvard Draft Convention on International Responsibility also adopted the principle in its Article 18(1).
9 Writers generally agree with the principle of the devolution of responsibility in the context of governmental changes. They, however, rarely address the other question of whether the same principle should apply in cases where actions of rebels result not in a change of government, but in the creation of a new state. 10 The limited numbers of writers who have indeed made this distinction and have tackled this specific question have reached the conclusion that there should be devolution of responsibility to the new state for acts 6 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 4.
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In fact, the only comprehensive work dealing partially with this question is that of Atlam committed by rebels before the achievement of independence.
11 Although scholars seem unanimous in supporting this principle, several different theoretical foundations have been submitted to explain it.
12
The approach, generally supported in doctrine, is that there is a continuity between the two subjects of international law, namely the insurrectional movement and the new state: they have the same legal identity. Consequently, the new state takes over the obligations arising from internationally wrongful acts which it committed while still an insurrectional movement not yet structured as an independent state. This is, for instance, the position adopted by the ILC:
The structure of the organisation of the insurrectional movement then becomes those of the organisation of the new State. In such a case, the affirmation of the responsibility of the newly-formed State for any wrongful acts committed by the organs of the insurrectional movement which preceded it would be justified by virtue of the continuity which would exist between the personality of the insurrectional movement and that of the State to which it has given birth . . . [A]n existing subject of international law would merely change category: from a mere embryo State it would become a State proper, without any interruption in its international personality resulting from the change. Atlam, supra note 1, at 23 ff., provides a comprehensive analysis of these different theories.
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Fourth Report on State Responsibility of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 2, at 131, paras 159 and 194. It should be noted that for a minority of authors the victory of the rebels results in the creation of an original new subject of international law (the new State), which is conceptually distinct from the other subject (the insurrectional movement), which is now extinct. There would therefore be a break in the chain of the continuity of legal personality between the movement and the new State. According to this approach the devolution of responsibility to the new State is simply based on the 'ordinary' existing rules of State succession between two distinct subjects of international law. This is, for instance, the position of Cansacchi, 'Identité et continuité des sujets de droit international', 130 Recueil des cours (1970-I) 1, at 42-43.
An important point is that this devolution of responsibility is solely based on the mechanisms of state responsibility and not on any rules of state succession.
14 This is generally agreed in doctrine, 15 as well as in the work of the ILC.
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At least four different theories have been elaborated in doctrine to explain the relationship of continuity between the insurrectional movement and the new state. These theories will be examined in the following subsections.
A The Theory of the Continuity of Government
According to this theory, continuity between the new state and the rebels arises from the fact that throughout the hostilities the rebels had been organized in a de facto government and had acted in such capacity.
17 From this continuity of government it would result that the new state should be held responsible for the acts committed by the de facto rebel government prior to independence.
The theory of the continuity of government is generally supported by international jurisprudence, 18 as well as in doctrine 19 in the different context of the establishment of a new government by the rebellion. However, this theory does not seem to be supported when the actions of the rebels result in the creation of a new state. This theory has also been rejected by the ILC. 20 In fact, the attribution to the new state of the acts of 14 The issue of State succession to rights and obligations arising from the commission of internationally wrongful acts is the object of this author's doctoral dissertation: Dumberry, supra note 5. 15 Atlam, supra note 1, at 435; Stern, supra note 11, at 344; Udina, supra note 11, at 768-769. Contra Czaplinski, supra note 11, at 353, who seems to view this issue as one dealing with the questions of State succession. Thus, for him, this rule is 'the exception to the general rule of non-responsibility of the successor State for the acts of its predecessor'. Dix case, US-Venezuela Commission, Award of 1903, at 9 UNRIAA 119, at 120. The case is about an American national (Mr Dix) who was involved in the cattle business in Venezuela at the time of important political turmoil between the Venezuelan government and some revolutionaries. The revolutionaries were in the end successful in their attempt to take power. The Tribunal decided that the revolutionaries (now forming the new government) should in principle be held responsible for the acts they had committed before their seizure of power and should compensate Mr Dix for his stolen cattle. This is the relevant passage of the Award of the Tribunal: '[t]he revolution of 1899 . . . proved successful and its acts, under a well-established rule of international law, are to be regarded as the acts of a de facto government. Its administrative and military officers were engaged in carrying out the policy of that government under the control of its executive. The same liability attaches for encroachments upon the rights of neutrals in the case of a successful revolutionary government, as in the case of any other de facto government.' It should be noted that the Tribunal nevertheless rejected the claim. Thus, it concluded that, in the circumstances of the case, the losses complained of were too remote to entitle Mr Dix to compensation and, in any event, the rebels had no deliberate intention to injure him. 
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Twenty-Seventh
Session, supra note 10, at 100, para. 2: 'for the purpose of attributing acts to the State, no distinction is made between the acts of organs of the insurrectional movement according to whether they preceded or followed the acquisition by the movement of effective power over a given region'.
insurgents is indeed quite independent from the other question of whether the rebels were exercising de facto power in part of the territory of the predecessor state, which subsequently became a new state. 21 A further weakness of the continuity theory is its limited application. Thus, it is limited only to those cases where the rebels have indeed established a regular 'government' during the hostilities, which is far from always the case.
22

B The Theory of the Legitimacy of the Struggle
Another theory submitted in doctrine to explain why a new state should be responsible for acts committed by an insurrectional movement before its independence is based on the idea of the 'internal legitimacy' of the struggle of the rebels against the predecessor state. 23 According to this theory, since the rebels' struggle would truly represent the 'desire' of the people they are fighting for, the new state should be held accountable for internationally wrongful acts committed by them during that liberation struggle.
Here again, this theory is generally supported by international jurisprudence, 24 as well as in doctrine 25 in the different context of the establishment of a new government by the rebellion. This approach does not seem to be supported when the actions of the rebels result in the creation of a new state. The major criticism that can be raised against the application of this theory to new states is the fact that it is not, of course, true in all cases that the rebels can be said to be representing the interests and the will of the people. 26 This point was highlighted in the work of the ILC. 27 The situation is Atlam, supra note 1, at 465. Referring to the case of rebels establishing a new government, G. Schwarzenberger, International Law (3rd edn., 1957), i, at 628, stated that this theory of the national will 'is no more than an empty fiction in the verbiage of political philosophy'.
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Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Twenty-Seventh Session, supra note 10, at 100, para. 2: '[t]he idea has also been put forward that, where the action of the insurgents was successful, they would be regarded as having represented the true national will ever since their uprising against the constituted power. But the very concept of "national will" is to be treated with caution, quite apart from the fact that, in general, international law is not greatly concerned with whether a given government is or is not the representative of the "true" national will. Even leaving that aside, it is difficult to maintain that the outcome of fighting should, like a judgement of God, establish retrospectively that the victors, from the outset of the civil war, were more representative of the true national will than the defeated.' See also Fourth Report on State Responsibility of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 13, at 145, para. 198.
clearly different in the other context where the legitimacy of one insurrectional movement in representing a people struggling for independence has been recognized by the United Nations. In this case, the theory of the legitimacy of the struggle may explain why the new state should be held accountable for internationally wrongful acts committed by the recognized rebel movement during the liberation struggle.
C The 'Resurrection' of State Theory
In some cases, the 'new' state may actually be an 'ancient' state, which only ceased to exist as an independent entity for a certain period of time. 28 The new state would thus be 'resurrected' through the struggle of the liberation movement. According to this theory, 29 there would be a continuity of identity between the 'ancient' state, the insurrectional movement and the 'new' state. Consequently, the newly 'resuscitated' state would be responsible for obligations arising from internationally wrongful acts committed by the rebel movement prior to independence.
The very notion of state 'resurrection' has been widely contested in doctrine and treated by authors as nothing more than a legal fiction without any foundation in international law. 30 In practice, states claiming to be identical to ancient states have nevertheless been regarded as new states. 31 Moreover, this theory can only find application in specific circumstances and can by no means be resorted to as a general explanation as to why new states should always be responsible for obligations arising from internationally wrongful acts committed by rebels in their struggle for independence.
D The Organic or Structural Continuity Theory
Finally, it has been submitted that it is the 'structural' continuity between the organization of the insurrectional movement and the organization of the new state which better explains why the consequences of responsibility should be accepted by 28 The general issue (unrelated to the specific question of insurrectional movements) is analysed in: Degan, 'Création et disparition de l'Etat (à la lumière du démembrement de trois fédérations multiethniques en Europe)', 279 Recueil des cours (1999) 195, at 293ff.
29
A summary of this thesis, as well as a list of writers supporting it, can be found in Atlam, supra note 1, at 437-455. Law (1968) , at 6: '[i]t could, however, be asked whether . . . there might not be identity of a State without its continuity. Unless the possibility of legal miracle is admitted, the question must be answered emphatically in the negative: there is no legal resurrection in international law. Once a State has become extinct, it cannot resume a continued existence.' See also Cansacchi, supra note 13, at 47-48. Contra Degan, supra note 28, at 293 ff, who indicates that the relevant factor is the lapse of time during which there was an effective lost of State sovereignty. He is of the view that in situations where the lapse of time is short the issue should be best understood as one of continuity of state rather than one of succession. the latter for internationally wrongful acts committed by the former.
K. Marek, Identity and Continuity of States in Public International
32 This is so for the reason that the rebels and the new state are essentially the same legal entity: 'from being only an embryo State, the insurrectional movement has become a State proper, without any break in the continuity between the two'.
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This approach is supported by many in doctrine as the appropriate way to explain the theory of continuity.
34 The 'organic' or 'structural' theory is indeed the most appropriate to explain the continuity between the insurgents and the new state and why the latter is responsible for the acts of the former prior to independence. The application of this theory is, however, not self-evident in cases where it is the efforts of not one, but many, rebels groups which led to the creation of a new state. It has been suggested in doctrine that in such cases, the new state should be held responsible for obligations arising from the internationally wrongful acts of all revolutionary groups, and not only for the movement which eventually becomes the new government of the new state. 
State Practice is Limited
However necessary and justified in contemporary international law the principle expressed in Article 10(2) of the Articles on State Responsibility may be, an analysis of state practice leads to the conclusion that the ground on which this principle rests is not as solid as is often indicated in doctrine. One therefore cannot fully agree with the statement made by the ILC Special Rapporteur James Crawford that 'the earlier jurisprudence and doctrine, at least, firmly support the two rules set out in article 15 [now Article 10]'. 36 The principle seems to be more a doctrinal construction than one based on actual state practice. Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 11, at 304; Zegveld, supra note 11, at 156; Atlam, supra note 1, at 476, 479. 35 Atlam, supra note 1, at 475, for whom the raison d'être of the continuity of the international legal personality between the new state and the movements (other than the one forming the new government) is based on the common goal of their struggle. For Atlam (at 484-485), these questions simply do not arise in the case where the struggle is made by a National Liberation Movement. Thus, since (according to him) the international legal personality is vested in the people and not in the movement, it does not make any difference which of the competing groups actually succeeds in forming a new state. In all cases, the new state would be held responsible for the internationally wrongful acts committed by the people, through any of the groups which fought for independence. Articles adopted on first reading by the Commission (1996) only mentions one single case of state practice, which is only of limited relevance. 37 The First Report on State Responsibility by James Crawford refers to one judicial decision, which is, however, not relevant in the present context as it does not deal with the consequences of internationally wrongful acts committed by rebels. 38 The same comment can also be made with respect to doctrinal analysis.
39
This author's analysis of case law leads to the discovery of only three examples of state practice dealing with the issue. These examples support (to some extent) the principle expressed in Article 10(2) of the ILC Articles.
A French Municipal Court Decisions in the Context of the Independence of Algeria
The former French colony of Algeria became an independent state in July 1962 after a civil war lasting eight years. The Conseil d'Etat decided similarly in the Grillo case. 53 In this case the Conseil d'Etat rejected a request by the plaintiff to annul a 1995 decision by the administrative court of Lyon, which in turn had rejected his request to annul a 1992 decision by the administrative tribunal of Nice. This tribunal had decided not to award the plaintiff any compensation for damage suffered by his company as a result of acts of the insurgents. The Conseil d'Etat concluded that both courts were right in rejecting the plaintiff's claim insofar as damage had been caused by a foreign state. 54 It therefore seems that the Conseil d'Etat interpreted the internationally wrongful acts committed in January 1962 by the FLN (i.e. before the independence of Algeria) as those of the future state of Algeria. Tables du Recueil Lebon.   50 Conseil d'Etat, 2/4 SSR, case no. 5059, 25 May 1970. This case dealt with a submission to annul an award made by a war damage commission in Algeria (before independence), which had rejected a claim for damages since it was resulting from internationally wrongful acts committed by both the rebels and the French army. The Conseil d'Etat concluded that it had no jurisdiction with respect to the part of the plaintiff's submission dealing with the damage caused by the rebels.
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Etablissements Henri Maschat, Conseil d'Etat, case no. 04878, 10 May 1968. In this case the Conseil d'Etat had to decide on a request submitted by the plaintiff to annul an award made by a war damage commission in Algeria (before independence), which had refused to provide any compensation to the plaintiff.
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Consorts Hovelacque, Conseil d'Etat, 2/6 SSR, case no. 35028, 13 Jan. 1984. In this case, the Conseil d'Etat was asked to annul a decision by the Paris administrative court which had found France liable for damage caused by the rebels. 
B The Socony Vaccum Oil Company Case before the US International Claims Commission
Another example involving internationally wrongful acts committed by rebels is the Socony Vaccum Oil Company case before the United States International Claims Commission. 55 The case arose out of the taking of property of the claimant by the Nazi puppet 'independent' state of Croatia during the Second World War. The claimant requested payment of $US11,325 million from Yugoslavia on the ground that the latter should be held responsible for the internationally wrongful acts committed by the 'independent' state of Croatia.
The Claims Commission concluded that this so-called 'independent' state of Croatia was actually a 'puppet' state created by Italy and Germany, which at no time had complete control over its territory and population, and which disappeared upon the retreat of foreign troops. In other words, the Claims Commission viewed the 'independent' state of Croatia as an unsuccessful attempt by an insurrection group (backed by the Nazi regime) to secede from Yugoslavia, which as a state had never ceased to exist. In one obiter dictum, the Claims Commission nevertheless made reference to the (successful) secession of the United States from the British Crown in 1776 and indicated that in such case the new state was responsible for the acts of the rebels committed during the revolution: States and Yugoslavia, and that it had never been the intention of the negotiators of the treaty to include such claims.
C A Legal Opinion of Great Britain in the Context of the American Civil War
In the context of the (unsuccessful) struggle of the Confederate Army for secession of the southern states from the United States during the American Civil War (1861-1865), the Law Officers of the British Crown gave a legal opinion during the war (16 February 1863). The Opinion states that if the rebels were to succeed in their secession efforts, the new state should be held responsible for their acts committed before independence. The Opinion states:
In the event of the war having ceased, and the authority of the Confederate State being de jure as well as de facto established, it will be competent to Her Majesty's Government to urge the payment of a compensation for the losses inflicted on Her Majesty's subjects by the Confederate Authorities during the War.
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This example is not the most solid precedent in support of the principle expressed in Article 10(2) of the Articles on State Responsibility. Thus, it is merely a legal opinion addressing what was, at the time it was issued, a theoretical question.
The Application of the Principle Adopted by the ILC in the Context of Different Types of Succession of States
The principle established in Article 10(2) of the Articles on State Responsibility seems to be perfectly applicable to cases of secession. 59 In such case, the new state (and not the continuator state) should be held responsible for obligations arising from internationally wrongful acts committed by the secessionist rebels against third states.
60 There are similarly no reasons to object to the application of Article 10 (2) to whether the principle of devolution of responsibility should find application in the contexts of newly independent states and cession and transfer of territory. This question will now be examined. The wording used in Article 10(2) of the Articles on State Responsibility clearly indicates that it applies to newly independent states since it contains the expression 'or in a territory under its administration', which refers specifically to the situation of a dependent colony not yet recognized as an independent state. 63 This is also clear from the use of the words 'movement, insurrectional or other', which includes national liberation movements struggling in the particular context of colonialism. The ILC thus rejected the distinction between national liberation movements and other movements in the context of this provision. 64 It held that '[f]rom the standpoint of the formulation of rules of law governing State responsibility, it is unnecessary and undesirable to exonerate a new government or a new State from responsibility for the conduct of its personnel by reference to considerations of legitimacy or illegitimacy of its origin'. 65 The assimilation of national liberation movements with 'insurrectional movements' has been criticized in doctrine, 66 as well as by several members of the ILC. 67 It was also contested by some states on the ground that this assimilation would not take into account the legitimacy of the struggle for independence of national liberation movements. 68 It was suggested by some states that if the struggle of a national 63 Like cases of secession, examples of newly independent states involve the creation of a new state while the predecessor state continues to exist. However, cases of newly independent states arise in the context of decolonisation where the territory of a colony is not considered part of the territory of the colo- In that sense, a newly independent state is a new state, which, however, cannot be said to have 'seceded' from the colonial power to the extent that its territory was never formally part of it. The most recent example of a newly independent state is East Timor which became independent in 2002. 64 liberation movement results in the creation of a new state, that new entity should not be held accountable for the internationally wrongful acts committed by the movement against third states during the struggle for independence. 69 The position of this author is that the principle established in Article 10(2) of the Articles on State Responsibility should apply to newly independent states in the same way that it applies in the case of secession: the colonial continuator state should not be responsible for internationally wrongful acts committed by successful rebels in their efforts to establish a new state in the context of decolonization. The legitimacy of the struggle for independence of national liberation movements does not result in any impunity for internationally wrongful acts committed during that struggle.
The question of whether Article 10(2) of the Articles on State Responsibility is applicable to cession and transfer of territory is also controversial. 70 The ILC Commentaries to the 2001 Articles on State Responsibility indicate that this provision does not cover a 'situation where an insurrectional movement within a territory succeeds in its agitation for union with another State'. 71 This interpretation apparently derives from the wording of Article 10(2), specifically referring to the creation of a 'new State'. Consequently, the work of the ILC suggests that Article 10(2) of the Articles on State Responsibility does not find application in cases of cession and transfer of territory where no new state is created as a result of the mechanism of succession of states.
It is submitted that the non-application of Article 10(2) of the Articles on State Responsibility in the context of cession and transfer of territory could lead to unfair results. Firstly, it would certainly be unfair for the continuator state to be held liable for internationally wrongful acts committed by rebels who manage to remove part of its territory and have it attached to another state. Secondly, internationally wrongful acts committed before the date of succession should not simply go unpunished based on the (rather technical) reason that the actions of the rebels did not establish a new state, but led to the attachment of the territory to an already existing state. For the injured third state which has suffered damage as a result of the internationally wrongful act committed by the rebels, it matters little whether the actions of the rebels led to the creation of a new state or a cession of territory. The already existing state which now has a territory enlarged as a result of the successful actions of the rebels should compensate any injured third state for internationally wrongful acts committed by the rebels before the date of succession. This solution is based on fairness and should apply notwithstanding the fact that there is no 'organic continuity' between the rebels and the successor state.
72 Therefore, the principle established in Article 10(2) of the Articles on State Responsibility should apply in the context of cession and transfer of territory.
For similar reasons, Article 10(2) of the Articles on State Responsibility should also apply to cases of total incorporation of a state into another already existing state, even if it does not result in the creation of a new state.
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Conclusion
The work of the ILC and doctrine has long considered as a well-established principle of international law the fact that whenever an insurrectional movement succeeds in creating a new state, that new state should be held responsible for obligations arising from internationally wrongful acts committed by the insurrectional movement against third states during the armed struggle for independence. The new state should remain responsible for acts which took place before its independence because there is a 'structural' and 'organic' continuity of the legal personality of what was then a rebel movement and what has since successfully become a new independent state.
The somehow surprising result of the research outlined here is the limited state practice which can be found in support of this principle. Thus, state practice ultimately consists of one obiter dictum by an internal United States compensation commission and one sentence taken from a legal opinion discussing the likely consequences arising from uncertain future events. Even the several French municipal court decisions, which held that the new state of Algeria was (in principle) responsible for the internationally wrongful acts committed by the FLN before 1960, had limited concrete implications since Algeria was in fact not a party to any of these proceedings.
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There could be an 'organic continuity' between the rebels and the successor state if the rebels were not only successful at having the territory removed from the predecessor state and having it attached to the successor state, but also successful at gaining power and becoming the government of the already existing successor state. 73 Cases of incorporation (or 'absorption') of states are defined as those where the territory of a state (the successor state) is enlarged as a result of the integration of the entirety of the territory of the predecessor state (which ceases to exist). The most recent example of incorporation of a state was when in 1990 the German Democratic Republic ceased to exist as an independent state and its territory, comprising 5 Länder, was integrated into the already existing Federal Republic of Germany.
Notwithstanding the fact that the principle expressed in Article 10(2) of the final 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility is based on limited precedent, it is this author's position that it should find application in the context of all cases of succession of states (including newly independent states and cession and transfer of territory). This principle is fair and equitable in the context where the predecessor state ceases to exist as a result of the events affecting its territorial integrity (such as cases of unification, dissolution and incorporation of states). Thus, the application of ILC Article 10(2) ensures that an internationally wrongful act does not remain unpunished and that the injured state victim of such act is not left without any debtor against whom it can file a claim for reparation. In the other context where the predecessor state does not cease to exist as a result of the events affecting its territorial integrity (such as in cases of secession, newly independent states and cession and transfer of territory), the opposite solution of non-devolution of responsibility would certainly result in unfair consequences. Thus, it would no doubt be unjust for the continuator state to be held liable for internationally wrongful acts committed by rebels, with whom it simply had no involvement. This is all the more so considering that the consequence of such wrongful acts by the rebels ultimately led to the dismembering of its territorial integrity and the loss of part of its territory. It is further submitted that the principle expressed in Article 10(2) of the final 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility is also necessary because it addresses the important concern of the international community for order and stability of international legal relations between states.
